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PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION, ADJUDICATIVE 
 JURISDICTION, AND THE MINISTERIAL 
 EXEMPTION 
HOWARD M. WASSERMAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court decided the first signifi-
cant case of the October 2011 Term, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church and School v. EEOC.1  A unanimous Court held that a 
“called” teacher (a commissioned Lutheran minister) teaching secu-
lar subjects from a Christ-centered perspective could not prevail in 
an action challenging her termination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).2 
The Court for the first time recognized the “ministerial exemption” 
to the ADA and other federal employment discrimination laws,3 af-
 
†
 Professor of Law, FIU College of Law.  Different iterations of this paper were 
presented at the 2009 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, at PrawfsFest in 
July 2010, and at a faculty workshop at the University of Richmond School of Law in 
September 2011.  My thanks to all the participants in those programs for their com-
ments.  Special thanks to Chris Lund and Kevin Walsh for comments and suggestions 
on the current version. 
1 80 U.S.L.W. 4056 (2012). 
2 Id. at 4057-58, 4061-63; see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial 
Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 61-64 (2011) (describing the factual and procedural 
background of the case).   
3 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061.  
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firming the uniform position of the federal courts of appeals.4  The 
exemption provides that, under the First Amendment, federal em-
ployment discrimination law does not apply to claims concerning the 
employment relationship between religious institutions and their min-
isterial employees.5  Lower courts had defined ministerial employees 
broadly6 to include not only the heads of religious organizations.7  In-
stead, the exemption had been held also to cover anyone responsible 
for religious doctrine, teaching, and administration, including clergy,8 
religion, theology, and canon law scholars and teachers,9 pastoral 
counselors,10 ministerial administrators,11 lay administrators,12 and even 
organists and choir leaders.13 
The exemption is justified as preventing constitutionally problem-
atic second-guessing on ecclesiastical matters, thereby avoiding inter-
ference with the relationships between religious organizations and 
those who teach, speak, and minister on ecclesiastical and theological 
matters.14  The exception also prevents secular courts from ordering a 
 
4 See id. & n.2.  Several circuits had addressed the issue.  See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Ro-
man Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2010); Rweyemamu v. 
Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 
474-75 (7th Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-07 (3d Cir. 2006). 
5 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061.  See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the 
Law?  The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1965, 1975-76 (2007) [hereinafter Corbin, Above the Law?]; Caroline Mala 
Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 106 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96, 97 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/colloquy/2011/22/LRColl2011n22Corbin.pdf [hereinafter Corbin, Irony]; 
Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 156, 158-
59 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/27/LRColl2011 
n27Horwitz.pdf [hereinafter Horwitz, Act III]; Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment 
Institutions:  Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 118-22 (2009) [here-
inafter Horwitz, Institutions]; Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment 
Clause:  Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the 
Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 48-49 (2008); Lund, supra note 2, at 21-23.  
6 See Corbin, Above the Law?, supra note 5, at 1976-77. 
7 See Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061. 
8 See Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 200; Petruska, 462 F.3d at 304; McClure v. Salvation 
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1972). 
9 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
10 See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 224-25 (6th Cir. 2007). 
11 See Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1997). 
12 See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1240 
(10th Cir. 2010). 
13 Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006). 
14 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 
4056, 4063 (2012) (“The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and 
control who will minister to the faithful . . . is the church’s alone.”); id. at 4061 (de-
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church to hire someone into a ministerial position or to pay some-
one whom it does not wish to hire or employ, typical remedies in 
employment discrimination cases.15  Such a judicial order invades 
religious organizations’ core mission of educating and forming their 
members, which depends on their ability to select those who minister 
and teach religious doctrine.16   
The ministerial exemption is a specific application of the broader 
freedom of the church doctrine—also styled as the church autonomy 
doctrine—which recognizes the constitutional liberty of religious or-
ganizations to manage their institutions and limits the reach of secular 
or civil authority into their internal workings.17  Church autonomy re-
 
scribing the right of churches to control “selection of those who will personify its be-
liefs”); see also Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and 
Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1612 (arguing that government nonentanglement with 
religious groups includes leaving them the freedom to “organize themselves, define 
their mission, and choose their workers”); Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, 
Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
175, 175 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/28/ 
LRColl2011n28Garnett.pdf (“The ‘ministerial exception’ . . . is a clear and crucial im-
plication of religious liberty, church autonomy, and the separation of church and state 
. . . .”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations:  Disputes Be-
tween Religious Institutions and their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 154 (2009) 
(“[T]he ministerial exception limits the power of the state to specify the content of the 
clerical office or the terms of the relationship between cleric and congregation.”). 
15 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061. 
16 See id. at 4064 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment protects 
“certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship services and other 
religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical process of communicating the 
faith”); Berg et al., supra note 14, at 176 (“[The exemption] protects the fundamental 
freedom of religious communities to educate their members and form them spiritually 
and morally.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 120 (arguing that religious liberty pro-
tects churches’ choice of leaders). 
17 See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (describing the 
freedom “to select the clergy” as emanating from “a spirit of freedom for religious or-
ganizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation”); Skrzypczak, 611 
F.3d at 1242 n.4 (“Th[e] church autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of in-
ternal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and 
polity.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of 
Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002))); see also Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment 
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1998) 
(“[T]he autonomy of the [religious] group is nonetheless protected [by the Establish-
ment Clause] from interference by whatever value preferences that modern society 
seeks to impose . . . .”); Richard W. Garnett, “Things That Are Not Caesar’s”:  The Story of 
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (arguing that church autonomy commands the minis-
terial exemption), in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 171, 187-89 (Richard W. Garnett & 
Andrew Koppelman eds., 2011); Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy, 
and the Structure of Freedom [hereinafter Garnett, Religious Liberty] (“[T]he Constitution 
guarantees religious freedom not only to individual believers but also to the Church as 
an organized society with its own law and jurisdiction.” (internal quotations marks 
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quires that secular authority keep its “hands off” matters of faith, reli-
gious doctrine, theological pronouncements, the structure and inter-
nal governance of religious institutions, and other matters of the 
spiritual domain.18  The doctrine previously manifested itself in a series 
of Supreme Court decisions involving disputes over church property.  
As the Court recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, these cases confirm that 
there are limits on the government’s power to interfere with a 
church’s determination of who can minister.19 
The church autonomy doctrine’s limitations on state authority en-
sure a structural balance separating church and state as competing 
sovereigns within American society, each with irreducible authority in 
its own “sphere.”20  The First Amendment ensures the “penultimacy of 
the state,” and the ultimacy of the church, in those areas in which the 
church must predominate,21 as well as the converse in those areas in 
 
omitted)), in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  AN INTRODUCTION 271 (John Witte, 
Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the 
Religion Clauses:  The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1981) (arguing that “churches have a constitutionally pro-
tected interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference”); 
Lund, supra note 2, at 10 (“The ministerial exception arises from the conflict between 
employment laws and constitutional principles of church autonomy.”); Lupu & Tuttle, 
supra note 14, at 120 (arguing that the First Amendment protects control over internal 
affairs of religious organizations).  
18 See Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061 (describing church control over “internal 
governance” as a means of “protect[ing] a religious group’s right to shape its own faith 
and mission”);  Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine:  What Are 
We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 854 (2009) [hereinafter, Garnett, 
Hands-Off] (“The hands-off rule, then, is . . . a rule that state actors should not render 
religious decisions . . . .”); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off!  Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts 
Over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“[S]ecular courts must not 
determine questions of religious doctrine and practice.”); Lund, supra note 2, at 12 
(“By requiring the government to stay out of religious affairs, the Constitution commits 
matters of religious belief and practice exclusively to the private sphere.”); see also 
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating the general rule that 
courts cannot interfere with religious organizations’ choices about clergy). 
19 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4059-60. 
20 See Garnett, Hands-Off, supra note 18, at 849 (describing the constitutional man-
date that secular and religious authorities “‘not interfere with each other’s respective 
spheres of choice and influence’” (quoting EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
916-21 (2d ed. 2005))); Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 161 (“[C]ourts, and the state 
itself, are simply not authorized to intervene in life at the heart of churches.”); Horwitz, 
Institutions, supra note 5, at 83, 107-08 (applying the theory of “sphere sovereignty” to 
the ministerial exception); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 121 (arguing that the reli-
gion clauses “limit[] government to the secular and temporal, and foreclos[e] govern-
ment from exercising authority over the spiritual domain”). 
21 Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 91. 
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which the state should predominate.22  It reflects the injunction to 
“render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the 
things that are God’s.”23 
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, the courts of appeals uniformly recognized 
some form of ministerial exemption.24  Even the EEOC and the plain-
tiff in Hosanna-Tabor acknowledged that the First Amendment prohib-
ited the core case of federal law requiring ordination of women by the 
Catholic Church or by an Orthodox Jewish seminary.25  The divide was 
over the exemption’s scope beyond that core—how to define minister, 
and whether the exemption should extend beyond those who perform 
core, basic religious functions to actors on the periphery, such as lay 
teachers.26  While the Supreme Court recognized the exemption, it 
declined to adopt a “rigid” formula for defining a minister, leaving 
harder questions for another day and concluding simply that the 
teacher in this case did qualify, based on her title, religious training, 
self-identification, and job functions.27 
A second open issue surrounded the ministerial exemption prior to 
Hosanna-Tabor :   its proper jurisdictional characterization.  Is the ex-
emption a jurisdictional limitation or an aspect of the merits of a 
claim?  Does it reflect a First Amendment limitation on the reach of 
substantive secular law into matters of faith, doctrine, and church gov-
ernance?  Or does it limit the adjudicative jurisdiction of the courts in 
which such disputes might be resolved?  Put differently, if and when 
the ministerial exemption defeats a claim in federal court, does the 
claim fail because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or be-
cause the plaintiff’s claim fails on the merits? 
Lower courts divided on this issue along multiple, confusing, and 
often incoherent lines.  Some circuits treated it as a question of the 
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, resolvable on a Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion.28  Other circuits treated it as a merits issue.29  Still other cir-
 
22 See Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 161 (“This allocation of authority is not in-
tended to signal the primacy of churches or the inferiority of the state.  It is a double-
sided settlement . . . .”). 
23 Matthew 22:21. 
24 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
25 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 
4056, 4061 (2012). 
26 See Lund, supra note 2, at 64-65.  Compare Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 163-64 
& nn.34-36, with Corbin, Irony, supra note 5, at 103-06. 
27 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061-63. 
28 See, e.g., McCants v. Alabama-West Fla. Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 
Inc., No. 09-13316, 2010 WL 1267160, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2010); EEOC v. Hosanna-
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cuits had not taken an explicit position, simply taking cases as the dis-
trict court characterized them, whether as merits determinations,30 
jurisdictional dismissals,31 or without characterization.32  And one cir-
cuit actually had contradictory panel decisions.33  The few scholars to 
engage the question had argued that it was a limit on the jurisdiction 
of the court,34 or at least described it with jurisdictional rhetoric.35 
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the characteriza-
tion question, nor did the issue arise during oral argument.  Neverthe-
less, the Court noted and resolved the conflict in short order in a 
footnote, stating: 
[T]he exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable 
claim, not a jurisdictional bar.  This is because the issue presented by the ex-
ception is “whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,” 
not whether the court has “power to hear [the] case.” . . . District courts have 
power to consider ADA claims in cases of this sort, and to decide whether the 
claim can proceed or is instead barred by the ministerial exception.”36 
 
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 775-76 (6th Cir. 2010); Tomic 
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006); Combs v. Cent. Tex. 
Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1999). 
29 See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1242 
(10th Cir. 2010); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2006); Werft 
v. Desert Sw. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 
F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 
1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 478 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (“The fact that enforcement of the [Fair Labor Standards Act] in a partic-
ular case would entangle the court in an ecclesiastical controversy would be a com-
pelling reason to dismiss that case, but not a reason founded on a lack of jurisdiction 
over a plaintiff's claim . . . .”). 
30 See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 
361-62 (8th Cir. 1991). 
31 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2008). 
32 See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
33 Compare Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 
1997) (affirming jurisdictional dismissal), with Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming merits dismissal 
based on statutory interpretation). 
34 See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 81 (arguing that the requirement that courts de-
cline review of ministerial employment cases “seems to be another way of saying that 
the Constitution removes . . . the subject-matter jurisdiction”). 
35 See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 44 (“It is helpful to envision the scope of this juris-
dictional bar as a sphere within which the Supreme Court has stated that churches may 
operate free of civil constraints.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 121 (“[T]he Religion 
Clauses are primarily jurisdictional . . . .”); id. at 146 (arguing that courts should not be 
“vest[ed] with jurisdiction to decide on the quality of a minister’s job performance”). 
36 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056, 
4063 n.4 (2012) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)). 
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In doing so, the Roberts Court continued its recent jurisprudential 
project of correcting “profligate” and “less than meticulous” use of the 
word jurisdiction in the lower courts, while signaling to lower courts 
the need to avoid issuing jurisdictional rulings that are not, upon 
fuller analysis, truly jurisdictional.37  It also marked the second time in 
recent years that the Court resolved a circuit split on a jurisdic-
tion/merits issue in passing in a case in which jurisdictionality was not 
directly in play.  Two terms ago, the Court made a two-page detour to 
pronounce the merits character of the extraterritoriality of federal secu-
rities fraud statutes.38  This time, the Court did it in a footnote. 
Hosanna-Tabor correctly characterized the ministerial exemption as 
a limitation on the merits of the employment discrimination claim.  I 
repeatedly argued for this position before the Court entered the mix,39 
including in this Essay, which was written and accepted for publication 
in October 2011 (before the Court discovered unanimity and thus was 
able to decide the case fairly quickly).  But the Court’s jurisdictionality 
footnote was entirely conclusory, failing to explain why the issue con-
trols whether the plaintiff’s allegations entitle him to relief rather than 
whether the court has power to hear the case. 
It thus remains to unpack why the exemption is, in fact, a merits 
doctrine.  First, doing so demonstrates the correctness of the conclu-
sion in Hosanna-Tabor, putting to rest any normative dispute on the 
issue.  Second, mischaracterization of the ministerial exemption re-
sulted from the same category errors that plague characterization of 
other legal issues; this issue illustrates nicely the routine conflation of 
jurisdiction and merits and courts’ failure to maintain clean lines be-
tween doctrines and underlying concepts.40 While the Court’s conclu-
 
37 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006); see also Howard M. Wasser-
man, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 947-48 (2011) 
[hereinafter Wasserman, Drive-by]; Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil 
Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 311, 315-16 (2012) [hereinafter Wasserman, Revival]. 
38 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77. 
39 See Howard Wasserman, Characterizing the Ministerial Exemption, Again, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 4, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/ 
characterizing-the-ministerial-exemption-again.html; Howard Wasserman, Tenth Circuit 
Gets Ministerial Exemption Right, Appellate Procedure Wrong, PRAWFSBLAWG ( July 20, 2010), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/07/tenth-circuit-gets-ministerial-
exemption-right-appellate-procedure-wrong.html [hereinafter Wasserman, Tenth Circuit]. 
40 See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure:  Thoughts on 
a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Mer-
its, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 227 (2008) [hereinafter Wasserman, Non-
Extant Rights]; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. 
REV. 579 (2007); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 
(2005) [hereinafter, Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits]. 
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sion that the exemption is merits-based might be enough to signal 
lower courts on future jurisdictionality issues, actual analysis and ex-
planation may better enable them to understand and recognize the 
limits of what goes to jurisdiction and, inversely, the breadth of what 
goes to substantive merits. 
This Essay, I hope, provides that analysis. 
I.  JURISDICTION AND DISABILITIES 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court reached the correct conclusion about the 
jurisdictionality of the ministerial exemption:  it is a constitutional af-
firmative defense to an otherwise cognizable employment discrimina-
tion claim that defeats the claim on the merits.41  But the Court did 
not provide the normative foundation for that conclusion, which is 
what this Part sets out to do. 
Our starting point must be to define “merits,” which we can do 
in any of four ways. 
The first definition asks whether a provision of federal law 
“reaches” the defendant’s conduct, meaning it “prohibits” that con-
duct.42  As I have argued previously, the “same idea may be framed as 
whether the statute applies to, binds, legally constrains, or controls 
some actor or conduct.”43 
Second, and relatedly, we could ask whether the creator of a legal 
rule—most notably Congress—has “asserted regulatory power over the 
challenged conduct.”44  This could ask either whether the legislature did 
assert regulatory power over some actors or conduct, or whether it con-
stitutionally could assert regulatory power over those actors or conduct. 
Third, we could say that merits issues dictate “who is entitled to sue 
whom, for what, and for what remedy.”45  A plaintiff prevails on her 
claim when applicable law permits her to sue this defendant for this 
conduct and entitles her to this remedy; she fails on her claim if ap-
plicable law does not permit suit against this defendant for this con-
duct or for this remedy. 
 
41 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061, 4063 n.4. 
42 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
43 Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 950. 
44 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
45 John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998); see also Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 236 
(“The substantive merits of a legal claim of right focus on who can sue whom over what 
real-world conduct and for what remedy under applicable law.”). 
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Finally, we can frame the concept in Hohfeldian terms.46  The mer-
its of a claim ask whether the legal rule under which the plaintiff sues 
establishes a right in her and imposes a duty on the defendant, and 
whether the defendant’s conduct was inconsistent with that duty, vio-
lating the plaintiff’s rights and entitling her to some remedy.47  A 
plaintiff prevails if she can show a violation of a right-duty combina-
tion on the facts at issue. 
Ultimately, all four framings get at the same idea:  merits turn on 
whether an enforceable legal rule exists as law that protects the 
plaintiff; controls the defendant; regulates the conduct, transaction, 
or occurrence at issue; and renders the defendant liable to the plain-
tiff for some remedy. 
A.  The Many Faces of Jurisdiction 
The conception of church and state as competing, coexisting sov-
ereigns has long been framed in jurisdictional terms.  John Calvin 
spoke of two sovereigns, one religious and one civil, given “the not in-
appropriate names of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction.”48  In A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, John Locke similarly spoke of matters belonging 
to the church and the worship of God being “removed out of the 
reach of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.”49  The Hosanna-Tabor Court 
looked to James Madison for the same idea.  As President, in vetoing 
a bill that would have incorporated the Protestant Episcopal 
Church, Madison emphasized “the essential distinction between 
civil and religious functions.”50 
  Modern law-and-religion scholars similarly speak of the First 
Amendment in power terms, that is, as deriving from churches’ sover-
eign nature and limiting the state’s authority to secular and temporal 
 
46 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (describing the theory of legal relations). 
47 See id. at 32 (explaining the correlation between rights and duties); see also Was-
serman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 236 (describing Hohfeld’s theory). 
48 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 140 (Henry Beveridge 
trans., 1953) (1536); see also Horwitz, Institutions, supra note 5, at 83-84, 107 (describing 
theory of “sphere sovereignty”). 
49 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans. 1689), 
available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm. 
50 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 
4056, 4060 (2012) (quoting 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982-83 (1811) (veto statement of 
President James Madison)). 
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concerns.51  The First Amendment thus imposes a “jurisdictional bar”52 
that limits the reach of civil jurisdiction over spiritual matters.53  
Therein lies the source of the confusion.  Jurisdiction, Evan Lee ar-
gues, means “something like legitimate authority.”54  But there are 
many forms of legitimate authority—or jurisdiction—vested in many 
distinct legal bodies and actors.  Simply labeling the ministerial ex-
emption as jurisdictional is imprecise; the question is “legitimate au-
thority in whom to do what.”55  This sets up two fundamental, 
overlapping distinctions that drive the merits/jurisdiction divide gen-
erally and the ministerial exemption in particular. 
1.  Adjudicative Jurisdiction and Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
The first distinction is between adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction on 
the one hand, and prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction on the other. 
Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to pre-
scribe legal rules and to regulate real-world behavior.  It can be under-
stood under any of our definitions:  as the power to assert regulatory 
authority over some actors and to prohibit or regulate some conduct; 
as the power to establish Hohfeldian rights and duties; or as the power 
to determine who can sue whom for what primary conduct.56  The 
most common wielder of prescriptive jurisdiction is the legislature, 
which bears primary responsibility for establishing prospective legal 
rules of general applicability to real-world behavior. 
The Constitution primarily deals in prescriptive jurisdiction.  It 
speaks to Congress’s authority to prescribe legal rules, establishing in-
ternal limits (e.g., the requirement that regulated conduct affect inter-
state commerce, or the limits on congressional power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment57) and external limits (e.g., the First Amend-
 
51 See e.g., Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 158-59 (citing Michael W. McConnell, 
Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 7, 8). 
52 Esbeck, supra note 17, at 49; Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 63, 88.  
53 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 121 (“[T]he Religion Clauses are primarily 
jurisdictional, limiting government to the secular and temporal, and foreclosing gov-
ernment from exercising authority over the spiritual domain.”). 
54 Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003). 
55 Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 261. 
56 See Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 236 (considering jurisdiction 
under each framework); supra text accompanying notes 42-47. 
57 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (power 
to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 607, 609, 619-20 (2000) (discussing limits on Congress’s prescriptive power 
under both provisions). 
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ment freedom of speech, or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion58) on that power.  These limits operate as what Matthew Adler and 
Michael Dorf call constitutional “existence conditions.”59  For a sub-
constitutional legal rule, such as a statute, to come into existence as 
valid and enforceable law, it must satisfy certain constitutional condi-
tions, notably legislative enactment in compliance with these internal 
and external limits.60  Any rule that does not satisfy those constitution-
al conditions does not exist as law; it is nonlaw.61  Most constitutional 
provisions (e.g., the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment) func-
tion as existence conditions:  where a purported subconstitutional rule 
conflicts with an internal or external constitutional limit on legislative 
power, it never comes into existence as law, and never becomes a valid 
and enforceable rule regulating real-world conduct.62  No legal rule 
reaches (prohibits) the conduct at issue, and no right/duty combina-
tion ever comes into existence as law.63 
Constitutional existence conditions limit prescriptive jurisdiction.  
They deprive the government of jurisdiction—legitimate authority—to 
enact legal rules that are inconsistent with those conditions, and any 
legal rule or right/duty combination purportedly created does not 
exist as law.  This is true both where the legislature enacts a rule that 
must be rejected as unconstitutional for exceeding the limits of the 
existence condition, and where the legislature, recognizing the consti-
tutional limits on its prescriptive power, declines to enact a legal rule 
or enacts a narrower legal rule where a broader rule would exceed 
constitutional limits.64 
The key, however, is that nonexistence of a legal rule does not de-
prive a court of judicial jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under ap-
propriate law.  A claim of right fails because there is no legal rule—
 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I; id. amend. XIV; see also Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra 
note 40, at 252-55 (describing external limitations the Constitution places on Con-
gress’s legislative power). 
59 Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial 
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003). 
60 See id. at 1120 (“[A] constitutional provision is an existence condition for that 
type of law if no proposition can be law of that type unless the provision is satisfied.”). 
61 Id.  
62 See id. at 1113 (arguing that the First Amendment “can also be understood as set-
ting forth existence conditions for legislation”); id. at 1154 (“All agree (tacitly) that 
[the Commerce Clause] states an existence condition.”). 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 42-47. 
64 See Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 244-45, 250-55 (providing ex-
amples of both situations). 
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and no right/duty combination—to be enforced, which results in the 
failure on the merits of any claim brought under that purported rule. 
The First Amendment regularly functions as an existence condition 
for subconstitutional legal rules and a limit on legislative authority to 
enact those rules.  Consider, for example, Bartnicki v. Vopper.65  The 
Court held that an individual could not be liable for damages under 
federal wiretap statutes for disseminating an unlawfully intercepted 
telephone conversation where the defendant was not involved in the 
interception.66  The First Amendment broadly protected dissemination 
of truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public con-
cern, and vested defendants with a constitutional liberty to publish 
such information free from legal constraint.67  The statute prohibiting 
the defendant’s conduct thus did not exist as law because it failed to 
satisfy the First Amendment existence condition.  The wiretap statute 
exceeded constitutional limits on Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction 
and thus could not reach the defendant or his conduct.68 
Similarly, the entire regime of First Amendment defamation law es-
tablished in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan69 and its progeny imposes an 
existence condition on state defamation law.  No existing legal rule 
allows a public figure to recover for defamation absent a showing of 
actual malice proven by clear and convincing evidence.70  Stated dif-
ferently, a subconstitutional legal rule without those protections ex-
ceeds the prescriptive jurisdiction of the institution charged with 
establishing defamation rules; such a rule cannot exist as law given 
First Amendment requirements.  Defamation is perhaps unique in that, 
as a common law legal rule, courts—rather than legislatures—exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction.  But that distinction is immaterial; the point is 
that the First Amendment imposes a limit on the authority to prescribe 
substantive legal rules, regardless of who may exercise that power.71 
The ministerial exemption should be understood in similar terms, 
given that cases arise in an identical procedural posture—the First 
Amendment provides a defense in a civil action brought under a sub-
 
65 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
66 Id. at 518. 
67 Id. at 525, 527-28. 
68 Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 253-54. 
69 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
70 Id. at 285-86. 
71 Many of the foundational church autonomy cases involved property disputes 
grounded in state common law.  See, e.g.,  Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 U.S. 696 (1976); see also Horwitz, Institutions, supra note 5, at 116 (discussing early 
church property disputes). 
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constitutional rule.  The ministerial exemption limits the right/duty 
combinations that Congress can create between religious organiza-
tions and their ministerial employees, as well as the conduct that Con-
gress, exercising its prescriptive jurisdiction, can prohibit in that 
relationship.  In other words, it is accurate to say that the First 
Amendment erects a “jurisdictional bar,” so long as we understand 
that the jurisdiction barred is Congress’s prescriptive or legislative ju-
risdiction to enact legal rules regulating some real-world conduct.  
Closely related to prescriptive jurisdiction is enforcement jurisdic-
tion—the power of the executive or an executive-branch agency to 
enforce legislatively enacted legal rules.  In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, the Supreme Court considered whether the NLRB, the agency 
charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
possessed statutory authority to order the Catholic Diocese to recog-
nize and bargain with a union representing lay teachers in diocesan 
schools.72  The Court held that the Board lacked such power, at least 
absent a “clear expression of Congress’ intent” to confer that authority,73 
given that Board enforcement would “‘almost necessarily’” create First 
Amendment problems in that situation.74 
The Catholic Bishop Court spoke in jurisdictional terms, albeit in-
consistently.  At times, it framed the issue as whether teachers at 
church-operated schools are “covered by the Act,”75 which sounds in 
the merits realm of the reach of the statute.  At other times, the Court 
framed the issue as whether teachers in church-operated schools were 
brought “within the jurisdiction of the Board.”76  The problem, even 
then, was the Court’s less-than-meticulous use of key terms.77  Asking 
whether the Board has jurisdiction really asks whether the executive 
has the authority to enforce the NLRA against the actors and conduct 
at issue.  This, in turn, depends on (1) whether the Board is, in fact, 
the agency vested with enforcement authority,78 and (2) whether the 
 
72 440 U.S. 490, 491 (1979). 
73 Id. at 507. 
74 Id. at 496 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977)).  
75 Id. at 504. 
76 Id. at 507. 
77 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
78 Take an admittedly simple example.  Imagine a person given a traffic ticket by 
the police of Municipality A when his car was parked illegally in Municipality B.  The 
ticket would be invalid and the prosecution would fail—not because any court was 
without jurisdiction and not because Municipality A lacked the authority to regulate 
parking, but because the police in Municipality A lacked enforcement authority under 
the parking laws of Municipality B. 
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substantive provisions of the Act reach the actors and events at issue.  
The latter question turns on the scope of the prescriptive jurisdiction 
that Congress could or did exercise in enacting the law in the first 
place.  In other words, it asks whether the Catholic Church can be 
regulated under the terms of the NLRA, regardless of who the en-
forcing body or entity is. 
The relevant executive enforcement agency for employment dis-
crimination law is the EEOC, which possesses statutory authority to 
investigate and bring civil actions against violators of federal employ-
ment discrimination laws.79  Like the NLRB, the EEOC’s enforcement 
power depends on the existence of conduct subject to the reach of the 
underlying statute.  Thus, the agency’s power to institute an action is, in 
one respect, coextensive with that of a private plaintiff:  both depend on 
the merits issue of the existence of enforceable substantive law violated 
by real-world conduct.  Absent existing law that reaches and regulates 
the conduct at issue, there is nothing for the EEOC to enforce.  As in 
Catholic Bishop, the First Amendment’s religion clauses affect the stat-
ute’s reach and, therefore, the EEOC’s enforcement authority. 
Prescriptive jurisdiction, and its corresponding enforcement juris-
diction, contrasts with adjudicative jurisdiction.  The latter is a court’s 
root power to adjudicate—to hear and resolve legal and factual issues 
under substantive legal rules, and to provide the adjudicative and re-
medial forum to resolve claims of right.  Adjudicative jurisdiction has 
nothing to do with the ultimate success of a claim on its merits, but 
rather focuses solely on whether the court has the power to provide a 
forum for considering and resolving the legal and factual disputes un-
der those rules in either direction.80 
Failure to distinguish prescriptive jurisdiction from adjudicative ju-
risdiction is the fundamental flaw in the adjudicative jurisdiction ap-
proach to the ministerial exemption. Greg Kalscheur and others 
frequently emphasize the jurisdictional referent in church autonomy 
and in the religion clauses, speaking of limits on “federal jurisdiction” 
 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (granting the EEOC authority to investigate 
and initiate civil actions to enforce Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (cross-referencing 
§ 2000e and granting the EEOC the same authority to enforce the ADA).  The EEOC 
initiated the civil action in Hosanna-Tabor, and the former employee, Cheryl Perich, 
intervened.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 
U.S.L.W. 4056, 4058 (2012). 
80 Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 948; Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, su-
pra note 40, at 261. 
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or “civil jurisdiction” or of constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of 
civil or secular government and authority.81 
Again, however, a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a case under ex-
isting substantive law is different from Congress’s jurisdiction to bring 
that substantive law into existence in the first place.  The ministerial 
exemption is indeed a constitutional bar on civil jurisdiction.  But the 
bar is not on the court’s civil jurisdiction to decide the case before it, 
but on Congress’s civil jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating 
churches’ conduct toward ministerial employees.  The nonexistence of 
an enforceable legal rule means the statutory claim to enforce that 
rule fails—on the merits. 
2.  Adjudicative Disabilities and Regulatory Disabilities 
The difference between types of jurisdiction maps onto a second dis-
tinction—between adjudicative disabilities and regulatory disabilities.  
An adjudicative disability means courts are disabled from adjudicating—
from hearing and resolving the legal and factual issues presented—
because of an absence of adjudicative jurisdiction.  A regulatory disabil-
ity means government institutions, especially legislatures, are disabled 
from enacting legal rules that regulate particular real-world conduct 
and actors, and it arises from an absence of prescriptive jurisdiction. 
Scholars routinely speak of the religion clauses as imposing an ad-
judicative disability or a limit on judicial competence.82  Courts must 
avoid deciding, or even inquiring into, ecclesiastical matters.83  To be 
sure, there is an adjudicative disability at work with the ministerial ex-
emption.  A court will be unable to conclude that a ministerial em-
ployee suffered discrimination.  It cannot enter a judgment in favor of 
a ministerial employee plaintiff or grant her a remedy or relief for the 
harm she suffered; it can do nothing but reject a ministerial employee’s 
claims.  That disability preserves the necessary area of church authority 
over spiritual matters and avoids secular entanglement in those issues. 
 
81 See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 81-85, 91-95; supra note 35; see also Tomic v. Catho-
lic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing First Amendment 
limits in jurisdictional terms). 
82 See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 6 (describing First Amendment–imposed limits on 
judicial “competence”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 122 (“[T]he Constitution 
disables civil courts from resolving certain classes of questions.  This is an adjudica-
tive disability . . . .”). 
83 See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Blocking 
such inquiries—such entanglements of the secular courts in religious affairs—is one of 
the grounds on which the ministers exception was devised . . . .”). 
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But the limitation on judicial decisionmaking is incidental to the 
broader limitation on legislative power and on the reach and scope of 
the substantive law Congress can enact.  The First Amendment disa-
bles all secular law and all secular institutions from regulating the 
church’s actions on matters of faith, structure, and membership, plac-
ing these matters entirely beyond the authority of the state.84  The ju-
diciary is implicated only because that is the forum in which secular 
legal rules are enforced.  But the judicial limitation arises not from an 
absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence of existing 
legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an 
absence of prescriptive authority to enact those rules.  The problem, in 
other words, is not that courts are barred from evaluating a priest’s job 
performance or from ordering his reinstatement; it is that secular 
lawmaking institutions are barred from enacting rules that provide a 
legal basis for evaluation or reinstatement. 
Thomas Berg captured this best in insisting that the ministerial ex-
emption rests fundamentally on substantive nonentanglement—which 
frees religious organizations to organize themselves, define their mis-
sion, and choose their workers without undue government interfer-
ence—and not merely decisional nonentanglement.85  The point is not 
that the First Amendment should not countenance judicial inquiries 
into matters of faith and religious structure; it is that the First 
Amendment should not countenance substantive law regulating mat-
ters of faith and religious structure, such as who can minister the gos-
pel.86  That is the “realm[] the law is not free to enter.”87 
As discussed earlier, the First Amendment can impose a regulatory 
disability and limit prescriptive jurisdiction in either of two ways—by 
causing Congress to legislate narrowly in light of constitutional con-
cerns or by invalidating any rule Congress did enact.88 Put another 
way, either Congress did not exercise its prescriptive authority to reach 
the conduct at issue or Congress exceeded that authority by attempt-
ing to regulate that conduct.  Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, circuits adopting 
the merits view of the ministerial exemption had divided over how ex-
 
84 See Lund, supra note 2, at 35 (describing areas with which the “government 
should be flatly barred from interfering”). 
85 Berg, supra note 14, at 1612-13; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 120 (argu-
ing for a focus on Congress’s “regulatory capacity”). 
86 See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 44 (describing the “sphere” within which “churches 
may operate free of civil constraints”); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056, 4061 (2012). 
87 Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 162. 
88 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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actly it operated.  Some treated it as a First Amendment affirmative 
defense to the claim.89  Others interpreted the applicable federal stat-
ute narrowly in light of First Amendment problems (as in Catholic Bish-
op) and read the limitation into the statute itself; Congress was 
deemed not to have asserted regulatory authority or to have reached 
the church/minister relations in its statutory enactment.90 
Hosanna-Tabor clearly resolved this point, holding the ministerial 
exemption to be constitutionally grounded in both religion clauses 
and to work as an affirmative defense that defeats the statutory dis-
crimination claim.91  In other words, the First Amendment stripped 
Congress of its authority to regulate the employment relationship 
between churches and ministers, rendering the ADA unconstitution-
al in the case at hand. 
While it is helpful that the Hosanna-Tabor Court took a firm stance 
on how the prescriptive limitation functions, it made no difference to 
the broader conclusion that the exemption derives from a prescriptive 
limitation and is thus a merits doctrine.  Under the Court’s position, 
Congress exercised its regulatory jurisdiction, but the statute exceeded 
that jurisdiction by attempting to control the employment relationship 
between the church and its ministerial employees in a way inconsistent 
with the First Amendment.  Under the alternative approach, Congress 
would be deemed to have declined to exercise regulatory jurisdiction 
that it lacked in any event, likely recognizing the First Amendment–
imposed limits on its legislative authority.  The end point is always that 
no legal rule exists as law protecting the minister plaintiff, regulating 
the church defendant, or imposing liability on the church defendant 
for its employment decisions as to the ministerial employee.  And the 
claim brought to enforce that nonexistent rule must fail. 
B.  Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exemption 
With these two distinctions in mind, Hosanna-Tabor becomes an 
easy case on the jurisdictionality issue. 
Cheryl Perich was a teacher at a Lutheran-affiliated school.92  She 
began as a lay teacher and became a called teacher one year later, hav-
 
89 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. 
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006). 
90 See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972). 
91 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4063 n.4. 
92 Id. at 4057-58. 
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ing completed colloquy classes on the Christian faith.93  With her call, 
she received a certificate of admission into the teaching ministry and 
received the title of “commissioned minister.”94  Her teaching duties 
remained the same before and after receiving her call; she taught a 
range of secular subjects in kindergarten and fourth grades, while also 
leading religious observance and instruction.95  The school sought to 
provide a “Christ-centered education” that incorporated God and reli-
gion into all its subjects.96 
Perich took several months off while suffering from narcolepsy; the 
school objected when she sought to return to her teaching duties.97  A 
dispute followed, which ultimately resulted in the school offering 
Perich a peaceful release from her duties, which meant resigning her 
call; Perich refusing; and the church rescinding the call.98  The church 
viewed her insubordination and threats to sue as violations of Luther-
an doctrines requiring internal resolution of all religious disputes.99  
After Perich filed a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC filed a civil ac-
tion against the church, and Perich intervened as a plaintiff.100 
There should be no question that there was a statutory basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court.  The claim was one 
under the ADA, a federal statute; it therefore was a civil action “arising 
under” the laws of the United States.101  The district court also could 
adjudicate the case as a civil action “brought under” the ADA.102  Given 
these statutory grants of authority, the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Whether the plaintiff’s claim ultimately succeeds or fails 
must be beside the adjudicative jurisdictional point. 
The real question was the breadth of the ministerial exemption, 
but the Supreme Court identified a broad constitutional exception 
that barred Perich’s ADA claims.103  In other words, the First Amend-
ment imposed a regulatory disability on Congress, depriving it of pre-
 
93 Id. at 4058. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 4057. 




101 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see also Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, supra note 40, 
at 695-96 (offering definitions of “arising under”). 
102 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(f)(3). 
103 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061-63. 
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scriptive authority to enact the ADA and to regulate a church-affiliated 
school in its employment relationship with the minister-plaintiff.  
We can explain this conclusion through any conception of merits.  
We could say that the ADA does not—and cannot, in light of the First 
Amendment—reach the church-operated school’s conduct toward 
Perich; this, the Morrison Court told us, is the same as saying that the 
ADA does not, and cannot, prohibit the church’s conduct as to this 
employee.  Or we could say that Congress did not, and could not, as-
sert regulatory authority over the church school as to its employment 
relationships with a commissioned minister such as Perich.  Or, in 
Hohfeldian terms, no right-duty correlative was breached.  Perich, as a 
commissioned minister, had no secular right not to be fired by the 
church for reasons related to her functions, and Hosanna-Tabor had 
no secular duty not to fire her for such reasons.  Or we could say that 
Perich, or the EEOC on her behalf, could not sue the church for its 
employment decisions seeking reinstatement or back pay because she 
was a ministerial employee.  
The point is that no statutory rule exists as law subjecting the 
church-operated school for this employment decision affecting this 
employee.  The EEOC and Perich’s civil action to enforce such a non-
existent rule fails, a failure on the merits under any of our definitions. 
On the other hand, had the Hosanna-Tabor Court held that the 
ministerial exemption did not apply on the facts at hand—because, for 
example, Perich was not a minister—application of the ADA would 
have been constitutional.  And we could frame it as the converse of the 
merits definitions:  the ADA does, and can, reach the church and pro-
hibit it from firing Perich because of her disability; Congress did, and 
could, assert regulatory authority over a church-operated school as to 
this employment relationship; Perich does have a secular right not to 
be fired for her disability, the church does have a secular duty not to 
do so, and that right/duty correlative was breached on the facts at 
hand.  Perich could sue the church for its employment decision, and 
she would be entitled to a remedy for its violation of the statute. 
We then would move to the central statutory inquiry of whether the 
church violated the ADA in firing Perich.  If it did, then the EEOC and 
Perich would have won on the merits. 
II.  CHARACTERIZATION IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdictionality was not formally in play in Hosanna-Tabor.  The 
Court did not grant certiorari on it.  The issue did not arise during 
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oral argument, although at one point the Solicitor General described 
the exemption as “a question of the realm of permissible governmen-
tal regulation,”104 language sounding in substantive merits.  One ami-
cus supporting the church argued the subject matter jurisdiction un-
understanding,105 although using much of the reasoning and analysis 
criticized in Part I of this Essay.  
Nevertheless, it is neither surprising nor unwelcome that the Court 
reached out to resolve the issue, even if only in a conclusory fashion. 
 As noted earlier, this analysis was consistent with the Roberts 
Court’s jurisdictional project of eliminating “drive-by jurisdictional 
rulings,” decisions in which a legal rule is treated as jurisdictional only 
through “unrefined” and “less-than meticulous” analysis and labels, 
without rigorous consideration of the meaning or consequences of 
those labels.106  The Court in the last decade has decided several juris-
dictionality cases, explicitly holding in all but one that the provision at 
issue was not jurisdictional.107  In particular, the Court has twice adopt-
ed a merits interpretation of a federal claim–creating statute in the 
face of a circuit split over whether limits on the scope and reach of the 
statute defeated claims on the merits or deprived courts of jurisdic-
tion.108  The Court thus was seizing another easy opportunity to resolve 
a circuit split on jurisdictionality.  Indeed, several Justices—including 
the Chief Justice, the author of Hosanna-Tabor—seem to have an inter-
est in procedural issues, so the desire to resolve the issue, even in a 
case in which it was not squarely presented, was somewhat expected.109  
 
104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056 (No. 10-
0553), 2011 WL 4593953, at *39. 
105 Brief for WallBuilders, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28-34, 
Hosanna Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056 (No. 10-0553), 2011 WL 2581850, at*28-34. 
106 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
107 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 80 U.S.L.W. 4045, 4048 (2012) (holding that the 
statute relating to required content in a Certificate of Appealability for habeas petition-
ers is nonjurisdictional); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 
(2010) (holding that the extraterritorial reach of federal law is a merits question); Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (holding that the requirement 
of copyright registration is a nonjurisdictional precondition to suit); Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (holding that the definition of employer under Title 
VII is a merits issue).  But see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206-07 (2007) (“We have 
long and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdic-
tional in nature.”).  In a second case, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 
130, 132 (2008), the Court held that the statute of limitations on claims against the 
United States in the Court of Federal Claims is not waivable or forfeitable and can be 
raised at any time, although the Court did not explicitly label it jurisdictional.   
108 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877; Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511, 516. 
109 Wasserman, Revival, supra note 37, at 312. 
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Morrison provided the model for what the Court did here.  The 
Court had granted certiorari to consider the extraterritorial applica-
tion of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to misconduct 
by foreign defendant corporations that harmed foreign plaintiffs in 
foreign-exchange securities transactions.110  Lower courts were inexpli-
cably divided over whether extraterritoriality was jurisdictional,111 alt-
hough the Court did not expressly take the case for the purpose of 
considering or resolving that split.  Nevertheless, writing for a unani-
mous Court, Justice Scalia took a brief detour to insist that extraterri-
toriality was a merits question going to the statute’s reach, properly 
resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, rather than a jurisdictional ques-
tion resolvable on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.112  The Court then contin-
ued to the central question, holding that the statute did not have 
extraterritorial application and thus did not reach or regulate the 
conduct and actors at issue.113 
Hosanna-Tabor invited similar treatment.  As in Morrison, the lower 
court had adopted an adjudicative jurisdiction characterization, which 
the parties did not contest, but which was plainly erroneous on a more 
precise and refined understanding of the merits/jurisdiction divide.  
And, as in Morrison, the issue had divided the courts of appeals. 
Moreover, the circuit split on the ministerial exemption ran along 
multiple, confusing lines, demanding Supreme Court involvement.  As 
discussed earlier, some lower courts treated it as a question of the 
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction; other circuits treated it as a 
merits issue; others had not taken an explicit position; and one cir-
cuit actually had contradictory panel decisions.114  Given this inco-
herence among lower courts, the issue was ripe for Supreme Court 
resolution, and a wise exercise of supervisory power justified the 
Court addressing it in this context. 
It should not be surprising that the Court so easily dispatched with 
the issue.  The Court appears to be arriving at the view that jurisdic-
tion/merits cases are fairly straightforward.  It is easy to recognize 
when an issue relates to what the statute prohibits or to who can sue 
whom for what conduct.  There is no longer a need to grant certiorari 
or brief this specific issue because that merits characterization is simply 
 
110 130 S. Ct. at 2875-76. 
111 See id. at 2877. 
112 Id.; see also id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that, 
because the statute did not apply extraterritorially, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim). 
113 Id. at 2883. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 28-33. 
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obvious.  Instead, it can be handled in a few sentences, even in a foot-
note, in the course of resolving the real substance of the claim, such as 
whether Perich was a minister. 
The quick resolution also might suggest that the Court is adopting 
a more absolute approach to what constitutes a merits issue, an ap-
proach I previously urged.115  The Court has granted certiorari specifi-
cally to resolve a jurisdiction/merits dispute in only one recent case—
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.116  Arbaugh involved Title VII’s definition of 
“employer” as an entity having fifteen or more employees, with a unan-
imous court characterizing this as a substantive element of a claim and 
not as a limit on the court’s adjudicative jurisdiction.117  The key, the 
Court said, was whether Congress ranks a statutory limitation as juris-
dictional through a clear statement; if Congress did not, as with Title 
VII, then the issue is nonjurisdictional.118  Arbaugh’s plain statement 
rule in jurisdiction/merits cases119 unfortunately leaves Congress free 
to conflate merits and jurisdiction, and define all manner of substan-
tive issues as going to judicial jurisdiction.120  
Yet in neither Hosanna-Tabor nor Morrison did the Court cite Ar-
baugh or look for congressional statements or intent as to characteri-
zation.  In both, the Court characterized limitations on the scope 
and reach of the legal rule as merits-based simply because what a le-
gal rule prohibits and who it controls is, by its nature, a merits is-
sue.121  Congressional intent was irrelevant to the categorical 
conception of what are merits issues. 
Ironically, in deciding jurisdictionality issues in an unreasoned 
and unexplained footnote without the benefit of briefing, the Ho-
 
115 Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 953. 
116 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
117 Id. at 515-16. 
118 Id. at 514-16. 
119 This contrasts with issues dividing jurisdiction and procedure, which represent a 
more complicated divide and in which Arbaugh’s plain statement approach does work.  
See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 959 (“[T]he line between adjudicative juris-
diction and pure procedure is notoriously soft and confusing in practice . . . .”); id. at 
960 (arguing that Arbaugh works in drawing the line between jurisdiction and proce-
dure); see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 80 U.S.L.W. 4045, 4048 (2012) (holding that the 
statute relating to required content in a Certificate of Appealability for habeas petition-
ers is nonjurisdictional); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) 
(holding that the requirement of copyright registration is nonjurisdictional). 
120 See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 953. 
121 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 
4056, 4063 n.4 (2012); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
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sanna-Tabor Court essentially delivered a drive-by ruling.  The differ-
ence is that it got this one right. 
The Court also used less-than-meticulous language in discussing juris-
dictionality, prompting some continued confusion.  The last sentence of 
the Court’s footnote on jurisdictionality states, “District courts have power 
to consider ADA claims in cases of this sort, and to decide whether the 
claim can proceed or is instead barred by the ministerial exception.”122  
The idea of a claim being “barred” is often associated with jurisdic-
tion, although it becomes more complicated when we consider the 
different types of jurisdiction involved.123  Moreover, saying the claim 
can “proceed” suggests the ministerial exemption functions as a 
threshold to considering the ADA claim, which again sounds like ad-
judicative jurisdiction.  The Court appears to have meant that the min-
isterial exemption analysis determines the constitutional validity of the 
ADA on the facts of the case, and therefore the existence of the ADA 
as an enforceable legal rule in this case, which demands First Amend-
ment analysis prior to any statutory analysis.  But the threshold analysis 
still goes to the ultimate validity of the claim under a purported sub-
constitutional rule, not to the federal court’s root power to hear the 
claim arising under federal law.  
III.  JURISDICTIONALITY AND PROCEDURAL STRATEGY 
We might consider whether churches, religious organizations, and 
law-and-religion scholars are satisfied with the full outcome in Hosanna--
Tabor.  They won a broad ministerial exemption that at least suggested 
a wide scope for who is a ministerial employee, a result that has been 
welcomed by many commentators.124 
 
122 Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4063 n.4. 
123 See supra subsection I.A.1. 
124 See, e.g., Marc DeGirolami, The Historical and Particularist Quality of Hosanna-
Tabor, MIRROR JUST. ( Jan. 11, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/ 
mirrorofjustice/2012/01/the-historical-and-particularist-quality-of-hosanna-tabor.html; 
Richard W. Garnett, Hosanna-Tabor Ruling A Win For Religious Freedom, USA TO-
DAY.COM (Jan. 11, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/ 
story/2012-01-11/hosanna-tabor-church-state-case/52500140/1; Douglas Laycock, My 
Take:  Huge Win For Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 2012, 9:58 
AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/12/my-take-huge-win-for-religious-liberty-
at-the-supreme-court.  But see Mike Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW ( Jan. 12, 
2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/ministers-and-peyote.html. 
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But they did not get a jurisdictional characterization of the exemp-
tion,125 which many religious organizations had been pushing, often to 
great lengths.  As noted earlier, one amicus supporting the church in Ho-
sanna-Tabor argued the subject matter jurisdiction understanding.126  The 
church itself appeared to accept the lower courts’ jurisdictional character-
ization, arguing only that the court wrongly applied the exemption. 
Perhaps more telling was the 2010 Tenth Circuit decision in 
Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa.127  The plaintiff was a for-
mer lay administrator of a community outreach and education pro-
gram run by the Catholic Diocese who brought claims for gender and 
age discrimination following her termination.  The Diocese moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the ministerial 
exemption.128  The district court converted the motion to one to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim, then converted that to a motion for 
summary judgment when the parties presented evidence beyond the 
pleadings on the exemption issue.129  The court then granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Diocese on ministerial exemption 
grounds, agreeing that the plaintiff’s job responsibilities made her a 
ministerial employee.130  The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit, 
and the Diocese cross-appealed, urging the court of appeals to con-
vert the order back to a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal.  The Tenth Circuit 
properly declined to do so, correctly characterizing the ministerial 
exemption as a merits issue, before affirming the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Diocese.131 
Footnote 4 of Hosanna-Tabor quietly ends the debate and makes 
clear that future ministerial exemption disputes will be resolved as 
merits defenses.  But consider the irony of churches’ previous, and 
perhaps continued, insistence on the adjudicative jurisdiction view:  
religious organizations are better off with the merits characterization.  
 
125 Cf. Michael Moreland, Hosanna-Tabor:  Freedom of Religion (Not Merely Association) 
and a Note about Defenses, MIRROR JUST. ( Jan. 11, 2012, 2:47 PM), http:// 
mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2012/01/hosanna-tabor-freedom-of-
religion-not-merely-association-and-a-note-about-defenses.html (arguing that the minis-
terial exemption is best understood as a subject matter jurisdiction defense, but stating 
“I suppose it's a great day for religious freedom when one is left only to nitpick over the 
distinction between a jurisdictional bar and a defense on the merits”). 
126 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
127 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010). 
128 Id. at 1241. 
129 Id. (converting the motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d)). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1242.  I have questioned elsewhere whether the cross-appeal was procedur-
ally proper or necessary.  See Wasserman, Tenth Circuit, supra note 39. 
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A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on ministerial exemption grounds is with 
prejudice—it reflects a legal defect in the claim because no law exists 
subjecting the defendant to liability or entitling the plaintiff to a 
judgment.  Both a grant of summary judgment and a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal operate as judgments on the merits having preclusive effect; 
the plaintiff will be unable to initiate a new lawsuit based on these facts 
or events, and the church would be relieved from its burden of having 
to defend any further.  On the other hand, a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is 
without prejudice, not on the merits, and not preclusive; the plaintiff 
could refile the identical discrimination claims in state court.132  Had 
the Diocese prevailed on its cross-appeal in Skrzypczak, it would have 
converted a merits dismissal into a jurisdictional dismissal, opening the 
door for the plaintiff to refile her action in state court and forcing the 
Diocese to litigate all over again. 
Of course, were the plaintiff to refile in state court, the Diocese 
would again assert the ministerial exemption as the basis for dismissal, 
arguing that the First Amendment stripped state courts of jurisdiction 
as well.  This argument is problematic in two respects.  First, state 
courts are courts of general jurisdiction, meaning they have authority 
to hear claims purportedly brought under any existing law, regardless 
of source.  If the case fails in state court, then it must be because of a 
problem with the substance of the underlying law.  Second, a subse-
quent adjudicative jurisdiction dismissal in state court leaves the plain-
tiff entirely without a judicial forum empowered to hear her claim.  
Limits on federal adjudicative jurisdiction typically are premised on 
the availability of some alternative forum in which to seek relief. 
On the other hand, a person should not be entitled to any forum if 
no existing law gives her an enforceable right.  And this demonstrates 
why Hosanna-Tabor ’s conclusion as to the exemption’s merits nature 
was correct.  The First Amendment limits Congress’s authority to regu-
late church conduct by statute; Congress cannot enact the ADA or Title 
VII as an enforceable legal rule against religious institutions as to min-
isterial employees.  A ministerial employee can no more sue for em-
ployment discrimination in state court than in federal court.  
Religious organizations perhaps have pushed the adjudicative ju-
risdiction approach in pursuit of other procedural benefits, namely a 
quick exit from litigation and avoidance of the burden and expense of 
 
132 See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) 
(stating that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not preclude later 
adjudication in another court); Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, supra note 40, at 666 
& n.107 (explaining the nonpreclusive effect of Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals). 
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invasive discovery.  As a competing sovereign, the argument goes, 
churches must have every opportunity to quickly escape the burdens 
associated with having to litigate and deal with attendant costs and in-
trusions.133  Because subject matter jurisdiction typically is a threshold 
issue raised and resolved in the early stages of litigation, a successful 
ministerial exemption defense can be resolved at the outset, ending 
the litigation without extensive discovery.  At the same time, subject 
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, meaning the church 
cannot waive the exemption and can always go back to assert it.134 
But these procedural benefits are either illusory or available without 
mischaracterizing the exemption.  First, the church cannot escape dis-
covery.  No matter how the ministerial exemption is characterized, the 
court must determine whether it applies in a given case, which means an 
inquiry into (1) whether the defendant is a religious organization, and 
(2) whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee, however that is de-
fined.135  This is a factual inquiry—under the majority’s approach, a 
multifactor, fact-intensive inquiry—which necessarily requires discovery.  
We label this “jurisdictional discovery,”136 and it may be limited only to 
the plaintiff’s ministerial status and no other issue.  But discovery, and 
the attendant intrusion on the church and its officials, must be had. 
Perhaps religious groups believed that jurisdictional discovery 
would be narrower, shorter, and less intrusive, justifying the adjudica-
tive jurisdictional characterization.  But churches can achieve identical 
procedural benefits even with the exemption as a merits rule.  If the 
facts in a future case showing the plaintiff's ministerial character ap-
pear on the face of the complaint, a church can get early resolution of 
the legal issue, without the need for discovery, by filing a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. Alternatively, a church can file an early summary 
 
133 See Berg et al., supra note 14, at 189 (“[T]he ministerial exception protects 
against the burdens of litigation and investigation . . . .”); Kalscheur, supra note 5, 
at 89-90 (describing the exemption as reducing the social costs of litigation, akin 
to sovereign immunity). 
134 See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
135 Compare Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 
U.S.L.W. 4056, 4061-63 (2012) (considering multiple factors that made the plaintiff a 
ministerial employee), with id. at 4063-64 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
key is whether the religious organization sincerely believes the plaintiff is a minister), 
and id. at 4064 (Alito, J., joined by Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing for emphasis on the 
functional status of the plaintiff); see also Lund, supra note 2, at 71 (arguing for a two-
fold approach, looking at both job duties and whether the plaintiff holds clerical status 
or ecclesiastical office). 
136 S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 489, 491 (2010). 
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judgment motion asserting the ministerial exemption,137 and then ask 
the court to limit discovery only to fact issues going to the exemp-
tion.138  And a district court likely will agree to limit initial discovery 
where, as here, substantial First Amendment interests are implicated.139 
Second, it is important not to confuse true adjudicative jurisdiction 
rules from the procedural incidents of those rules, such as nonwai-
vability or early resolution.140  Many merits-based legal doctrines rest 
on similar policies of getting defendants out of litigation quickly and 
relieving them of the burdens of litigation.  For example, government-
official immunities in constitutional litigation are treated as defenses 
against suit and justified as protecting government officials from the 
costs, distractions, and burdens of litigation, which means they must 
have a chance at early exit from the case.141  But that immunity is never 
treated as a limit on adjudicative jurisdiction.  
Similarly, nonjurisdictional doctrines can be accorded procedural 
incidents of jurisdiction, such as nonwaivability, where the policy goals 
and values underlying that doctrine demand it.142  Thus, the ministeri-
al exemption could still be nonwaivable, even as a merits defense, if 
the policies underlying church sovereignty and church autonomy de-
mand this additional procedural protection.  The Hosanna-Tabor Court 
did not consider the waivability of the exemption and the problem has 
not arisen in prior cases, although perhaps this an issue for future cas-
es. 
The best explanation for insistence on adjudicative jurisdiction ar-
guments is symbolism—the symbolic meaning of winning on jurisdic-
tional grounds.  As Greg Kalscheur argues, when federal and state 
“courts clearly and consistently treat the ministerial exception as a lim-
itation on the subject matter jurisdiction of the civil courts, they make 
a powerful statement about the foundations of limited government:  
 
137 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) (“[A] party may file a motion for summary judgment at 
any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.”). 
138 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (listing factors for courts to consider in limiting 
the frequency or extent of discovery). 
139 See, e.g., Lipinski v. Skinner, 781 F. Supp. 131, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering 
First Amendment concerns in determining the scope of discovery). 
140 See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 83-85, 90 n.331 (noting procedural concerns af-
fecting the ministerial exemption).  
141 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (stating that qualified immun-
ity is immunity from suit and should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation).  
142 See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 963-64; see also Scott Dodson, Manda-
tory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that nonjurisdictional rules can pos-
sess jurisdictional traits). 
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Such statements affirm the penultimacy of the state.”143  A jurisdic-
tional win is perceived as an “uber-victory,”144 a uniquely profound and 
powerful litigation win.  It suggests that the church is so powerful or so 
protected as a competing sovereign as to be beyond the court’s author-
ity.  This symbolism trumps the procedural benefits that come with the 
merits characterization. 
But religious institutions remain special even if the ministerial ex-
emption provides a merits victory.  The Hosanna-Tabor Court insisted 
that the First Amendment “gives special solicitude to the rights of reli-
gious organizations.”145  It is, or should be, an equally powerful state-
ment on the penultimacy of the state that the church lies beyond 
Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction.  The religion clauses function just 
as much as a structural protection for religion when they bar Con-
gress’s exercise of its prescriptive regulatory authority and place reli-
gious organizations beyond the reach of secular law.  The church’s 
status as a special competing and predominant sovereign is doing just 
as much work in placing church personnel and organizational deci-
sions beyond congressional regulation.  The broader symbolic point—
that the church enjoys unique constitutional immunity from the state’s 
sovereign reach on some issues—remains.  And that symbolic point 
can be made without logical, theoretical, and doctrinal incoherence. 
CONCLUSION 
The only thing lost in the Court’s quick and unexplained resolu-
tion of the jurisdictionality issue is the chance to guide lower courts.  
The ministerial exemption is unquestionably now a constitutional af-
firmative defense to a statutory employment discrimination claim.  
There is less certainty as to how lower courts understand the funda-
mental difference between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction 
and how that, in turn, affects future jurisdictionality determinations. 
As I have argued elsewhere, clearing up confusion over jurisdic-
tionality and its analytical components has become a major part of the 
Roberts Court’s jurisprudential agenda.146  Hosanna-Tabor provided an 
opportunity to add to that agenda, and the Court took it, correctly la-
 
143 Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 51. 
144 Thanks to Lumen Mulligan for suggesting this phrase. 
145 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 
4056, 4061 (2012). 
146 See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 947-48. 
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beling the ministerial exemption as a merits issue that has nothing to 
do with a court’s adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Some analysis and explanation in support of its conclusion perhaps 
was warranted, however, both for justifying resolution of the circuit 
split over the ministerial exemption and for guiding lower courts in 
future cases on other jurisdictionality issues that similarly turn on the 
line between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction.  This Essay, I 
hope, provides the missing analysis.  It offers the normative basis for 
courts to define the line between jurisdiction and merits.  And it 
demonstrates that true limits on adjudicative jurisdiction are relatively 
few and that most of the limits that come before the courts go to the 
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